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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ROGER BELANGER and JESSIE
JOCELYN,
Plaintiff and Appellants,
vs.

LESTER RICE,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF

I
I

No. 8136

APPELL~T

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 1st day of May, 1952, the plaintiffs
and the defendant signed a lease agreement, under the terms
of which the plaintiffs leased to the defendant certain premises
known as 67 West 7th South St., Salt Lake City, Utah, from
the 17th day of March, 1952 to the 17th day of March, 1953,
at a monthly re ntal of $75.00 per month, commencing with
the 17th day of March, 1952. Exhibit "A," (T-50).
~
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The leased premises consisted of a small restaurant with
a counter and about 10 stools. The restaurant and leased premises was located at 67 West 7th South St., Salt Lake City,
Utah, and was built in front of a residence up to the sidewalk,
and the water was piped in from the residence part to the restaurant part (T. 18).
The premises were originally leased from a William
Y eiter and Jean Y eiter, . his wife, to the plaintiffs, and the
plaintiffs subleased same to the defendant Rice. Defendant
went into possession on March 17, 1952 and occupied
said premises up to December 1, 1952, and then moved
out (T. 18-19). He paid the rent up to December 1, 1952
and delivered the keys to the premises to the plaintiff, Jessie
Jocelyn, without any comments other than he was moving out
(T. 23-37).
Immediately thereafter the plaintiffs advertised the place
for rent and on or about the 8th day of December they obtained a renter for the premises in the person of a Mr. Jones
(T. 20). Mr. Jones went into the premises on said day and
remained there until December 28, 1952 (T. 22). At the time
Mr. Jones took over, the defendant was then living in the
premises back of the restaurant which he had rented from
Mr. Yieter, the original Lessor with the plaintiffs. Shortly
before Jones moved out the defendant, who had the control
of the water leading to the restaurant shut off the hot water
and without the hot water it was impossible to run the restaurant. The hot water, up to this time, was furnished by the
owner of the premises, Mr. Yieter, to the plaintiffs, and the
hot water was also provided by the defendant during the time
4
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he occupied the premises and up until Mr. Jones moved in
or shortly thereafter, and then was shut off by the defendant
(T. 20-39).
Plaintiffs then consulted with Mr. Yieter, the owner of
the premises, and he refused to do anything about it (T. 22).
Plaintiffs instituted suit in the Small Claims Court of Salt
Lake City against the defendant Rice for the balance of the
rent for December, 1952 and the defendant then settled with
plaintiffs for this balance, together with costs of advertising
the place for rent. The property then remained vacant for
the remainder of the lease term, due to the fact that the plaintiffs could not relet the premises without hot water, nor could
the plaintiff operate same themselves, which they intended
to do (T. 21-22).
On or about January 20, 1953 the plaintiffs commenced
an action against the defendant Rice in the City Court of Salt
Lake City, Utah, for the rent of said premises for the balance
of the term of the lease, to-wit: January, February and to
March 17, 1953, and recovered a judgment for the sum of
$202.50, costs and attorney's fees in the sum of $75.00
(T. 12-6). Subsequently to this an appeal was taken to the
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, and a trial de-novo
was had thereon. Pending the appeal and before the trial
thereof the defendant filed an amended answer in which he
sets forth certain facts not pertinent to the issues and which
did not constitute a defense affirmatively as stated and alleged
therein (T. 14}. There was no denial that the defendant vacated the premises on the 1st day of December, 1952, or

'
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offered any excuse or defense for his surrendering the premises.
If the court will review the testimony of the defendant and
his witnesses as contained in the transcript, there is no assertion or testimony of any kind going to any reason for abandoning the premises, other than the fact that the wife of the
defendant, who was operating the restaurant, was in ill health
(T. 19) nor was there any testimony or contention on the
part of the defendant that there was a mutual recission either
by act or conduct on the part of the plaintiffs or any other
defense or excuse for abandoning the premises. The court
took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the evidence and later rendered its judgment of no cause of action
against the plaintiffs (T. 15). Findings of fact and conclusions of law was entered by the court, merely finding that the
rent had been paid up to January 1, 1953 by the defendant.
At the conclusion of the trial and pending the decision of
the court the plaintiff moved the court for permission to file
a supplemental complaint to contain facts which had transpired
since the filing of the original complaint (T. 15) and without
ruling on the motion or otherwise permitting the filing of
said supplemental complaint rendered judgment, from which
this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
6
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING UPON THE
MOTION OF THE APPELLANTS FOR PERMISSION TO
FILE THEIR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT, OR PERMITTING SAID SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT TO BE
FILED BY THE APPELLANTS.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST
THE RESPONDENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF RENT OWING BY THE RESPONDENT TO THE APPELLANT FOR
THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT
AFTER ABANDONMENT.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED UPON
SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT TO APPRIZE THE APPELLANTS UPON WHAT REASONING OR FACTS THE
COURT RENDERED ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
7
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There is no pleadings in this case either by the original
answer of the defendant or by his amended answer which
constitutes a defense to the plaintiffs' cause of action, other
than a general denial which put this case at issue.
There is no evidence on the part of the defendant or his
witnesses which in any manner constitutes a defense to the
breach of the lease sued on herein.
Appellant is unable to point out specifically to any testimony on the part of the defendant or his witnesses in the
transcript which would raise a defense on his part, either
negatively or affirmatively and for that reason I am requesting
the Court to review this testimony from the transcript of the
evidence before the court in order t,::i' sustain the appellants'
contention in this respect.
Without having made any findings of fact or conclusions
of law as to how the court, or why the court finds in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiffs of no cause of action,
otherwise than the presumption that there was a mutual recission of the lease and it is difficult for appellant to present
any authorities to meet this situation other than present to
the court the law governing an abandonment of a lease agreement by a tenant. While there is no transcript of the court's
remarks made at the conclusion of the trial, (other than argument by counsel) ( T. 40) the court did inquire of counsel
to the effect, can a Lessor sue successively for each inonth' s
rent as it becomes due, or did the bringing of the action in
the small claims court by the appellant for the rent becoming
due in January, 1952 against the defendant preclude the ap8
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pellant from further action thereon? The appellant presumes
that such was the findings of the court, but the record is entirely
silent as to this.
For the purpose of sustaining the position of the appellants, appellants submit the following law generally governing
the rights of Lessors to recover from Lessees for an abandonment of the lease and premises, which, in the opinion of the
appellants governs the issues of this action.
The respondent, without offering any defense or excuse
for abandoning the leased premises, merely informed the appellants that he was going to vacate the premises on the 1st
day of December, 1952, because of the illness of his wife (T.
19). He then turned over the keys to the premises to the
appellants.
McCoy vs. Celestin, 71 Pac. 2d 936. Calif.
"It is the established law in this state, that when the
lessee of premises vacates them without justification,
the leaseor may take possession of the property for the
benefit of the tenant and relet the same and thereafter
maintain an action for the difference between the sum
he has in good faith received from re-leasing the premises and the amount provided for to be paid by the
terms of the lease.

In the instant case there was substantial evidence to
sustain the trial court's findings that defendant without
justification vacated the premises leased by him from
plaintiff and that plaintiff did not accept a surrender
of the leased premises, but took possession of the same
for the benefit of the defendant and released them for
his account. 123 Pac. 797; 210 Pac. 430.
9
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32 Am. Jr. 770. Par. 911.
"The mere entering and taking possession of premises abandoned by a tenant, for the purpose of leasing
them, is at best, an equivocal act not amounting to an
election by the landlord between an acceptance of surrender terminating the lease and his right to relet for
the purpose of mitigating the damages, for which the
tenant is liable.
Merely advertising the place for rent cannot be considered as constituting an acceptance of the tenant's
surrender, and the fact that a landlord, upon receiving
notice of his tenant's intention to vacate before the
expiration of the term, enters upon the premises for
the sole purpose of placarding them for rent does not
terminate the contract.
The institution of an action to recover rent for the
period between the time the premises were abandoned
by the tenant and the time when they were re-let establishes the fact that the landlord's taking possession was
for the purpose of reletting the premises in order to
mitigate damages, rather than for the purpose of accepting the surrender and terminating the lease.
The foregoing authorities substantially sustains the position and the acts and conduct of the appellants in their dealings
with the defendant pursuant to the evidence as contained in
the record of this case.

If the court took the position that the bringing of the
action by the appellants in the small claims court precluded
them from bringing a further action on this matter, and I
am assuming this, the following is the law on that point:
Shea et al. v. Leonis et al, 84 Pac. 2d 277, Calif.
"It is the settled law that where a lease is repudiated

10
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and the premises abandoned, the landlord has a choice
of tw? remedies: He may rest upon his contract and
sue hts tenant as each installment of the rent, or the
whole thereof becomes dues; or, he may take possession
of the premises and recover damages, which will be
the difference between what he may be able to rent
the premises for and the price agreed to be paid under
the lease.
32 Am. Jr. 433, Par. 527:
"A contract to pay money in installments is divisible
in its nature, and it is well established that each default
in the payment of an installment, may be the subject
of an independent action provided it is brought before
the next installment becomes due. Accordingly, if under
a lease of premises for. a definite term rent is payable
periodically, the landlord can maintain an action for
each installment as it becomes due, without in any
way violating the rule forbidding the splitting of causes
of action, and therefore without prejudicing his right
to sue for future installments as they become due. In
other words, recovery for rent for a subsequent period
which is not a demand existing at the time of the commencement of a suit for accrued rent, and cannot,
under the conditions of the lease, be recovered at that
time, is not barred by the recovery for the accrued rent.
Separate actions may be brought on the lease for each
installment, and a judgment for one installment of
rent is not a bar to a second action to recover for a subsequent installment.''
24 A.L.R. 891:
"It is too well established to admit of controversy
that rent is not due until it is earned, and that an actio~
cannot be maintained to recover rent before it is due
11
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by the terms of the lease. Hence the rule is universal
that where the rent for a subsequent period was not
a demand existing at the time of the commencement
of a suit for accrued rent, and could not, under the
conditions of the lease have been recovered at that
time, the subsequent action is not barred by the former
judgment.''
Appellant admits that at the time the action for the rent
was commenced in the City Court of Salt Lake City, January
20, 195 3, all of the rent for the unexpired term of this lease
was not due, but at least the rent for January 1, 1953-, and the
rent from January 17, 1953 to February 17, 1953, was due
and an action could be maintained on this according to the
foregoing citation, but before this matter was determined at
the conclusion of this case before the District Court, the motion
of appellants to file a supplemental complaint to include the
rent then long past due before the trial of the case should
have been granted in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
The foregoing quotations is the law in California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Wyoming.
32 Am. Jur. 777, Par. 915:

"If the rent for the entire period between rent days
is payable in advance, a surrender during the period
does not operate to discharge the rent or any portion
thereof for such period. The theory of this view is that
rent payable in advance is considered as accruing on
the day on which it is due."

12
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING UPON THE
MOTION OF THE APPELLANTS FOR PERMISSION TO
FILE THEIR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT, OR PERMITTING SAID SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT TO BE
FILED BY THE APPELLANTS.
As heretofore admitted by appellants, the entire rent for
the unexpired term of the lease was not due when the original
action was filed in the City Court. The rent from February 17th
to March 17th, 195 3 was not earned, but at the time of the
trail of this case the entire rent was long past due and in order
to avoid a multiplicity of actions as the law states, this matter
could have been determined in this action and for that reason
a motion was. made to the court for permission to file this
supplemental complaint. See supplemental complaint ( T. 15) .
Under Rule 15 (d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure this
motion should have been granted.
(d) SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS: Upon motion
of a party the court may upon reasonable notice and
upon such terms as are just permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court
deems it advisable that the adverse party plead thereto,
it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
Appellants think it not necessary to go into this question
further in view of the foregoing, and it is our opinion that the
court abused its discretion in failing to rule on the motion
or permit the appellants to file such a supplemental complaint.

13
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It, at no time, raised any new issue in t~e case, nor did the
respondent raise the issue in his pleadings or in the trial of
the cause of action.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST
THE RESPONDENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF RENT OWING BY THE RESPONDENT TO THE APPELLANT FOR
THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT
AFTER ABANDONMENT.
For the reasons as set forth hereinabove in this brief under
Points 1 and 2, appellants submits the arguments and the law
made and provided governing this matter and points of error
as raised by Point III, without further citations or arguments
as we believe same is fully covered hereinabove.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED UPON
SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT TO APPRIZE THE APPELLANTS UPON WHAT REASONING OR FACTS THE
COURT RENDERED ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS.
The only argument appellants desire to submit to the
court in support of the foregoing Point IV is to refer the court
14
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Jj

to the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the record of
this case (T. 43-44) which are self-evident and explanatory.
It is the contention of the appellants that such findings of fact
and conclusions of law are virtually a nullity and do not comply
with the following rule:
Rule 52 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
EFFECT. In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall, unless
the same are waived find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct
the entry of the appropriate judgment; and in granting
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions
of law which constitute the grounds of its action ... "
Appellants respectfully submit that the judgment of the
District Court in the foregoing matter should be reversed and
judgment entered for the appellants herein.
Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN SPENCE,
Attorney for Appellants

1"1
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